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Supranational Citizenship’s Enablers. Free Movement from the Part of Home Member States 
 
Francesca Strumia* 






In a quarter century of judicial scrutiny and scholarly debate, the relation between Union citizenship and 
the right to free movement has mostly been considered from the perspective of host Member States and 
their obligations. The role of home Member States has remained marginal and only been considered in 
conjunction with a restricted set of situations. This article recuperates the perspective of home Member 
States. Through a systematic analysis of the relevant case law, it distinguishes between three sets of 
obligations of home Member States in the context of the right to free movement: facilitation, guarantee 
and non-deprivation obligations. These obligations substantiate a key role of home Member States that 
finds only formal definition in the Treaties: home Member States are the very enablers of supranational 
citizenship and, in doing so, they transform and upgrade national citizenship. This upgrade points to 
alternative explanations for the ‘return to the national’ that part of the literature equates with 
supranational citizenship’s failure. It also yields a novel perspective on two unsolved problems in the 
relation between citizenship and free movement, namely the source of transnational solidarity, and the 
place of non-mobile citizens. 
 
Key Words: European Citizenship, Right to Free Movement, Transnational Solidarity, Static Citizens, 
Supranational Citizenship, Right to Leave, Home Member States, Transnational Stakeholders 
 
Introduction 
If the relation between Union citizenship and right to free movement were to inspire a movie, home 
Member States would appear in it at best as supporting actors. In the prevailing narrative, the protagonists 
of that relation have always been host Member States. As a result, three decades of close judicial scrutiny 
and extensive scholarly assessment have yielded a rather one-sided account. The perspective of home 
Member States has remained marginal. This article proposes a “remake” of the story that brings home 
Member States to the forefront.  
Home Member States have gained a prominent place in case law interpreting the Treaty freedoms ever 
since the consolidation of a restriction-based test for infringements of free movement.1 The relevant test 
searches for measures that have the effect of impeding or discouraging the exercise of movement. A 
similar effect often descends from legislation and policy of home Member States.2 Yet the resulting 
obligations of home Member States have rarely been looked at systematically in the literature.3 Scholars 
have paid more attention to home Member States in the context of article 20 TFEU.4 Even in this latter 
                                                 
*Senior Lecturer in Law. 
1 See Union royale belge des sociétés de football association and Others v Bosman (C-415/93) EU:C:1995:463; 
[1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 645. 
2
 See Bosman (C-415/93) EU:C:1995:463 at [96]. 
3 As an exception see A. Lazowski, “ ‘Darling You Are Not Going Anywhere’: The Right to Exit in EU Law” 
(2015) 40 E.L. Rev. 887; also see S. Iglesias Sanchez “A Citizenship Right to Stay? The Right Not to Move in a 
Union Based on Free Movement” in D. Kochenov (ed.) EU Citizenship and Federalism: The Role of Rights  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017). 
4 See e.g. P. Eleftheriadis, “The Content of European Citizenship” (2014) 15 German Law Journal 777, 780-782; A. 
Hoogenboom, “In search of a rationale for European citizenship jurisprudence” (2015) 35 Oxford Journal of Legal 
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context the emphasis has fallen on the rights and status that Union citizens derive from article 20 TFEU, 
rather than on the nature of the duties that the provision bestows upon home Member States.5 The 
analysis in this article flips the perspective. It revisits the case law on article 21 TFEU distinguishing 
facilitation and guarantee obligations of home Member States with regard to free movement. And it links 
these obligations to the duty of non-deprivation that home Member States owe to their nationals in respect 
to their Union citizenship under article 20.  
The central claim is that a holistic reading of relevant obligations yields a comprehensive picture of the 
role of home Member States as the very enablers of supranational citizenship.6 Home Member States’ 
duties to facilitate movement, provide guarantees in conjunction with its exercise and not unduly deprive 
citizens of their supranational status and rights confer substance to a role that the Treaties define only 
formally. A clearer understanding of this role challenges the lingering view in the literature that takes 
involvement of home Member states with rights pertaining to supranational citizenship as evidence of the 
latter’s shortfalls. From this view, home Member States’ responsibility for the welfare of their migrant 
nationals is due to the absence of supranational social citizenship;7 and home Member States’ 
responsibility for citizens in purely internal situations is due to the irrelevance of supranational citizenship 
in the absence of cross-border links.8 This perspective however disregards the fact that through enabling 
their nationals’ supranational citizenship home Member States upgrade their national citizenship. Their 
duties towards the needy and the non-mobile are a result of this re-empowerment of national citizenship 
rather than of the disempowerment of supranational one.  With regard to solidarity, this re-empowerment 
suggests a model of supranational social citizenship prompted by self-interest, and based on reciprocity. 
With regard to static citizens, it points to their transnational stakes that home Member States are in charge 
of protecting. 
 
The article findings in this sense ultimately complement existing literature, providing an alternative to the 
disenchanted assessment of the relation between citizenship and free movement prevailing in recent 
scholarship. Such disenchantment has prompted efforts to veer away from both sides of the citizenship-
free movement relation. On the one hand, it has triggered a re-assessment of Union citizenship, its rights-
                                                                                                                                                             
Studies 301; P. J. Neuvonen, “EU Citizenship and its very Specific Essence: Rendón Marin and CS” (2017) 54 
C.M.L.Rev. 1201; N. Nic Shuibne, “Case C-434/09, Shirley McCarthy v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, Judgment of the Court of Justice (Third Chamber) of 5 May 2011, nyr; Case C-256/11, Dereci and 
others v. Bundesministerium für Inneres, Judgment of the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) of 15 November 2011, 
nyr. (Some of) the Kids are All Right (2012) 49 C.M.L.Rev. 349; C. O’Brien, “Acte Cryptique? Zambrano, Welfare 
Rights, and Underclass Citizenship in the Tale of the Missing Preliminary Reference. Court of Appeal of England 
and Wales, Sanneh & Ors v. SSWP; Supreme Court, HC v. SSWP” (2019) 56 C.M.L.Rev. 1697; A. Tryfonidou 
“(Further) Signs of a Turn of the Tide in the CJEU’s Citizenship Jurisprudence, Case C-40/11 Iida, Judgment of 8 
November 2012, not yet reported” (2013) 20 MJ 302; L. Azoulai, “‘Euro-bonds’: The Ruiz Zambrano Judgment or 
the Real Invention of EU Citizenship” (2011) 3 Perspectives on Federalism E-31; A. Hinarejos, “Citizenship of the 
EU: Clarifying Genuine Enjoyment of the Substance of Citizenship Rights” (2012) Cambridge Law Journal 280; S. 
Reynolds, “Exploring the Intrinsic Connection between Free Movement and the ‘Genuine Enjoyment’: Reflections 
on EU Citizenship after Iida” Test, (2013) 38 E.L.Rev. 376. 
5 See e.g. Neuvonen, “EU Citizenship and its very Specific Essence” note 4 above. 
6 Both the terms ‘Union citizenship’ and ‘supranational citizenship’ are used throughout the article. The former is 
used to refer to the formal condition provided for in the EU Treaties. The latter is rather used to refer to the legal 
status and bundle of rights that this formal condition embodies and represents. 
7 See e.g. C. O’Brien, Unity in Adversity: EU Citizenship, Social Justice and the Cautionary Tale of the UK, 
(Oxford: Hart, 2017). 
8 See Ullens de Schootens v Belgium (C-268/15) EU:C:2016:874; [2019] 2 C.M.L.R. 7. On reverse discrimination 
see A. Tryfonidou, “Reverse Discrimination in Purely Internal Situations: An Incongruity in a Citizens’ Europe” 
(2008) 35 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 43. 
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protection role, and its political implications.9 And on the other hand, it has solicited arguments for the 
managing, resisting or repackaging of free movement rights.10 In both respects, the analysis in this article 
suggests a word of caution. 
The argument is developed in three parts. The first part offers a brief restatement of the mainstream 
narrative on Union citizenship and right to free movement. It highlights the preponderant role of host 
Member States and it considers the shortfalls of supranational citizenship emerging from that narrative. 
The second part recuperates the missing perspective of home Member States through a systematic 
analysis of the case law that articulates their obligations in the context of free movement. The last part 
considers, in light of the obligations analysed in the previous part, the role of home Member States as 
enablers of supranational citizenship and the implications of this role for the perceived shortfalls of 
supranational citizenship.  
Citizenship and Right to Free Movement: the Mainstream Story 
The Host Member States’ Perspective 
The relation between Union citizenship and free movement has been retold countless times in the 
literature.11 Through extensive commentary, the rulings of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) that 
populate the story of that relation have become classics of EU law jurisprudence.12 The key points in the 
story are well-known. First, in good part as a result of the ECJ adjudication efforts, the right to free 
movement and Union citizenship have become mutually dependent. The right to free movement depends 
on Union citizenship. And the activation of Union citizenship protections depends on the exercise of 
movement that creates albeit thin links between citizens and Member States other than the one of 
nationality.13 Second, and as a consequence of Union citizenship’s irrelevance in purely internal 
situations, static Union citizens may be subject to reverse discrimination in their Member State of 
nationality.14 Third, the right to free movement of non-economically active citizens, arguably the core of 
the relation under discussion, has evolved over time. It has seen a zenith and a nadir, through the 
succession between a rights-assertive and a Member State-deferent phase in the case law.15  
If this narrative is well-known, less well-remarked is the preponderant role that the host Member State 
perspective has occupied within it. While the Union citizens’ right to free movement calls for obligations 
                                                 
9 See e.g. Kochenov (ed.) EU Citizenship and Federalism, note 3 above; also see M. van den Brink, “EU Citizenship 
and (Fundamental) Rights: Empirical, Normative, and Conceptual Problems” (2018) 25 European Law Journal 21. 
10 See N. Nic Shuibhne, “Reconnecting the Free Movement of Workers and Equal Treatment in an Unequal Europe” 
(2018) 43 E.L. Rev. 477; G. Davies, “Brexit and the Free Movement of Workers: A Plea for National Legal 
Assertiveness” (2016) 41 E.L. Rev. 925; C. Barnard and S. Butlin, “Free movement v. Fair Movement: Brexit and 
Managed Migration” (2018) 55 C.M.L. Rev. 203. 
11 For a selection of effective restatements among many, E. Spaventa, “What is Left of Union Citizenship?” in 
Inclusion and Exclusion in the European Union, University of Amsterdam Collected Papers 34/2016; O. Garner, 
“The Existential Crisis of Citizenship of the European Union: The Argument for an Autonomous Status” (2018) 20 
C.Y.E.L.S. 116; O’Brien, Unity in Adversity, note 7 above, 37-52. 
12 See e.g. Trojani v Centre Public d’Aide Sociale de Bruxelles (C-456/02) EU:C:2004:488; [2004] 3 C.M.L.R 38; 
Grzelczyk v Centre Public d’Aide Sociale d’Ottignies Louvain la Neuve (C-184/99) EU:C:2001:458; [2002] 1 
C.M.L.R. 19; Ruiz Zambrano v Office National de l’Emploi (ONEm) (C-34/09) EU:C:2011:124; [2011] 2 C.M.L.R. 
46. 
13 See e.g. Baumbast v Secretary of State for the Home Department (C-413/99) EU:C:2002:493; [2002] 3 C.M.L.R. 
23. 
14 See Tryfonidou, “Reverse Discrimination in Purely Internal Situations” note 6 above. 
15 For a sample of the rights-assertive phase, see e.g. Trojani (C-456/02) EU:C:2004:488, Grzelczyk (C-184/99) 
EU:C:2001:458. For the Member State-deferent phase see e.g. Dano v Jobcenter Leipzig (C-333/13) 
EU:C:2014:2358; [2015] 1 C.M.L.R. 48. 
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on the part of both home and host Member States,16 the mainstream narrative on citizenship and free 
movement has been mostly weaved around the role of the latter. Home Member States’ obligations have 
been considered in a non-systematic manner. They have mostly been looked at in the context of article 20 
TFEU.17 While in the context of article 21 TFEU they have been considered in the context of specific 
niches of the case law,18 or to point at weaknesses in the relation between citizenship and free 
movement.19  
 
Host Member States have rather been at the centre of attention. This is particularly evident in the context 
of the saga of non-economically active citizens. The rulings that have become the main point of reference 
for the distinction between the rights-assertive and the Member State-deferent phase in the relevant case 
law revolve around host Member States’ obligations.  
 
The rights-assertive phase encompasses cases from Martínez Sala20 to Grzelczyck,21 Trojani,22 Bidar,23 
Collins,24 and still Vatsouras,25 in which the Court extended social assistance entitlements in host 
Member States to economically inactive migrants and maintenance support in host Member States to 
jobseekers and students. It articulated the relevant obligations of host Member States through a combined 
reading of the Treaty provisions on Union citizenship and the guarantee of non-discrimination on the 
basis of nationality.26 The Court also emphasized the host Member States’ duty to assess individual 
circumstances, and resorted to a rigorous application of the principle of proportionality.27  
 
The Member State-deferent phase can arguably be traced back to the 2007 Förster case,28 once again a 
host Member State case, in which the court upheld a five-year residence requirement in order for a student 
to qualify for maintenance aid. The court considered that the relevant requirement constituted a legitimate 
means for a host Member State to ensure that beneficiaries of benefits were sufficiently integrated into 
their society.29 Förster is just one in a long line of cases in which the court increasingly tempered the 
guarantee of equal treatment for migrant Union citizens through endorsing the host Member States’ 
search for genuine links between the claimant migrant Union citizens and their society or labour market.30  
                                                 
16 See arts. 4 and 5 of Directive 2004/38 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and 
reside freely within the territory of the Member States [2004] OJ L158/77. 
17 See note 4 above. 
18 See e.g. F. de Witte, “Who Funds the Mobile Student? Shedding Some Light on the Normative Assumptions 
Underlying EU Free Movement Law: Commission v. Netherlands” (2013) 50 C.M.L.Rev. 203. 
19 See e.g. E. Spaventa, “Citizenship: Reallocating Responsibilities to the Member State of Origin” in P. Koutrakos, 
N. Nic Shuibhne, P Syrpis (eds), Exceptions from EU Free Movement Law: Derogation, Justification and 
Proportionality (Oxford; London: Hart Publishing, 2016); also see O’Brien, Unity in Adversity, note 7 above. 
20 Martínez Sala v Freistaat Bayern (C-85/96) EU:C:1998:217. 
21 Grzelczyk (C-184/99) EU:C:2001:458. 
22 Trojani (C-456/02) EU:C:2004:488. 
23 R. (on application of Bidar) v Ealing LBC (C-209/03) EU:C:2005:169; [2005] 2 C.M.L.R. 3. 
24 Collins v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (C-138/02) EU:C:2004:172; [2004] 2 C.M.L.R. 8. 
25 Vatsouras and Koupatantze v Arbeitsgemeinschaft Nürberg 900 (C-22/08 and C-23/08) EU:C:2009:344. 
26 See e.g. Trojani (C-456/02) EU:C:2004:488 at [43]-[44]. For an overview of this case law, see D. Sarmiento and 
E. Sharpston, “European Citizenship and Its New Union: Time to Move On?” in Kochenov (ed) EU Citizenship and 
Federalism note 3 above pp. 228-229; K. Hailbronner, “Union Citizenship and Access to Social Benefits” (2005) 42 
C.M.L. Rev. 1245. 
27 See e.g. Baumbast (C-413/99) EU:C:2002:493. Also see Spaventa, “Seeing the Wood Despite the Trees” note 1 
above, 40-41. 
28 Jacqueline Förster v Hoofddirectie van de Informatie Beheer Groep (C-158/07) EU:C:2008:630; [2009] 1 
C.M.L.R. 32. 
29 Förster (C-158/07) EU:C:2008:630, at [51]-[52] 
30 See e.g. Bidar (C-209/03) EU:C:2005:169, Collins (C-138/02) EU:C:2004:172; also see O’Brien, Unity in 




The promise of access to social benefits for non-economically active citizens suffered increasing setbacks 
in a number of rulings issued from 2010 onwards. Beginning from Brey, and continuing in Dano, 
Alimanovic and Garcia Nieto, the court hardened the conditionality of residence rights in a host Member 
State for non-economically active citizens, weakening as a result the guarantee of equal treatment 
regardless of nationality.31 Scaling back on its previous attention for proportionality and individual 
circumstances, the court gradually caved in to the financial interests of host Member States.32 
 
In its assessment of this judicial story, and of the relation between Union citizenship and free movement 
more broadly, the literature has mostly deployed one of two lenses. The first is an aspirational 
constitutional lens.33 The second is a critical market-conscious one.34 Host Member States are central to 
both the scenarios that these lenses, respectively, magnify.  Looked at through the constitutional lens, the 
rights-assertive phase of the case law has inspired expectant views of supranational citizenship as a 
harbinger of transnational solidarity,35 as a potential vehicle for the protection of fundamental rights,36 as 
a tool for the extension of EU law’s jurisdiction,37 and as a ground stone of the sui generis federalism of 
the European Union.38 Those expectations have had as their main theatre host Member States, where in 
the famous words of an Advocate General Union citizens had to be able to proclaim ‘civis Europaeus 
sum’. Similarly, the restrictive turn of the case law has yielded, from this constitutional perspective, the 
sense of a failed promise.39 And again this was a promise of rights and status that had been supposed to 
articulate in a host Member State. 
 
Through the market-conscious lens, the scenario that the relation between citizenship and free movement 
depicted has always looked less rosy, but has nonetheless had host Member States as its main stage.  The 
rights that Union citizens can assert in host Member States remain inexorably market-based. Even when 
prompting a modicum of transnational solidarity as in the rights-assertive phase of the case law, 
                                                 
31 Pensionsversicherungsanstalt v Peter Brey (C-140/12) EU:C:2013:565; [2014] 1 C.M.L.R 37; Dano (C-333/13); 
EU:C:2014:2358; Jobcenter Berlin Neukolln v Alimanovic (C-67/14) EU:C:2015:597; [2016] 1 C.M.L.R. 29; 
Vestische Arbeit Jobcenter Kreis Recklinghausen v Jovanna García-Nieto (C-299/14) EU:C:2016:114; [2016] 3 
C.M.L.R. 5. Also see European Commission v United Kingdom (C-308/14) EU:C:2016:436; [2016] 3 C.M.L.R. 41. 
32 See Grzelczyck (C-184/99) EU:C:2001:458. 
33 Beginning from a series of Advocate Generals’ Opinions, Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Christos 
Konstantinidis, C-168/91, EU:C:1992:504, at [46]. Also see Opinion of Advocate General Colomer in Jörn 
Petersen, C-228/07, EU:C:2008:494, at [28]; Opinion of Advocate General Cosmas in Florus Ariël Wijsenbeek, C-
378/97, EU:C:1999:439; Opinion of Advocate General Colomer in Josef Baldinger, C-386/02, EU:C:2004:535; see 
also de Cecco, note 1 above, 387. 
34 See F. Scharpf, “Economic Integration, Democracy and the Welfare State” (1997) 4 Journal of European Public 
Policy 18, 27; M. Everson, “A Very Cosmopolitan Citizenship: But Who Pays the Price?” in M. Dougan, N. Nic 
Shuibne, E. Spaventa (eds) Empowerment and Disempowerment of the European Citizen (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2012).  
35 S. Giubboni, “Free Movement of Persons and European Solidarity” (2007) 13 European Law Journal 360, 368-
370; S. O’Leary, “Solidarity and Citizenship Rights in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union” in 
G. de Burca (ed), EU Law and the Welfare State: in Search of Solidarity (Oxford; New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2005); G. de Burca, “Towards European Welfare?” in G. de Burca (ed), EU Law and the Welfare State above.  
36 A. Bogdandy, M. Kottmann, C. Antpöhler, J. Dickschen, S. Hentrei, M. Smrkolj, “Reverse Solange-Protecting the 
Essence of EU Fundamental Rights against EU Member States” (2012) 49 C.M.L.Rev. 489. 
37 Spaventa “Seeing the Wood Despite the Trees” note 27 above, 42-43; D. Kochenov, “The Citizenship Paradigm” 
(2013) 15 C.Y.E.L.S. 197. 
38 See C. Schönberger, “Foreword: European Citizenship as Federal Citizenship: Studying EU Citizenship through 
the Federal Lens” in Kochenov (ed.) EU Citizenship and Federalism note 3 above. For a more recent take on EU 
citizenship’s federal character see van den Brink, “EU Citizenship and (Fundamental) Rights” note 9 above, 32-33. 
39 See e.g. E. Spaventa, “Earned Citizenship – Understanding Union Citizenship through its Scope” in Kochenov 
(ed.) EU Citizenship and Federalism, note 3 above, 222-223; O’Brien “Civis Capitalist Sum” note 1 above. 
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supranational citizenship commodifies social citizenship and disempowers the welfare system of host 
Member States. As recent case law illustrates clearly, this market-based citizenship ultimately creates new 
boundaries of exclusion. It forces the poor and the lazy out of the eye of EU law, depriving them of any 
rights and status in a host Member State.40 
 
Supranational Citizenship’s Shortfalls and the “Return to the National” 
 
Ultimately, the host Member State-focused perspective on the relation between Union citizenship and free 
movement highlights two shortfalls of supranational citizenship. The first is the weakness of European 
social citizenship.41 The second is the narrow personal scope of supranational citizenship protections. 
Relevant protections are only addressed to mobile citizens, and to a restricted elite of them.42  
 
It is in the context of these shortfalls that attention in the mainstream narrative turns back towards home 
Member States.  Lack of social citizenship in host Member States implies that the responsibility for the 
welfare of migrant citizens remains in relevant part with home Member States.43 And supranational 
citizenship’s bias towards the mobile means that the static citizens and their destinies remain within the 
exclusive purview of home Member States. Supranational citizenship’s tendency to fall back on the 
national in relevant situations reiterates the primacy of national citizenship, that is, home Member States’ 
citizenship.44 These findings come with an aura of negativity around them. A supranational citizenship 
that has to rely on national citizenship for solidarity is hollow. A supranational citizenship that leaves the 
static within the boundaries of their national citizenship is incomplete.45  
 
Hence in the mainstream narrative on citizenship and free movement, the involvement of home Member 
States is perceived as a sign of the disempowerment of supranational citizenship.46 Rules on citizenship, 
whether legislative or judicial, ‘return to the national’ every time that EU law does not have the force to 
secure rights for migrant citizens in host Member States, or to compel obligations on the part of the latter 
with regard to rights to free movement. The role of home Member States belongs, in this view, to the 
pathology rather than to the physiology of supranational citizenship. A supranational citizenship that has 
to fall back on national citizenship at every bump cannot claim to be a ‘fundamental status’ for its 
holders.47   
 
Yet home Member States play a crucial role in the context of supranational citizenship and its attached 
right to free movement. This is a role that begins well before the crisis of that relation. A systematic 
analysis of the obligations of home Member States in the context of free movement helps understand its 
scope and ramifications. The next part of the article is devoted to this analysis.  
                                                 
40 D. Kochenov, “On Tiles and Pillars: EU Citizenship as a Federal Denominator” in Kochenov (ed), EU Citizenship 
and Federalism, note 3 above, pp.35-41; Spaventa, “Earned Citizenship” note 39 above, p.209. 
41 See in general O’Brien, “Civis Capitalist Sum” note 39 above. 
42 See in this sense R. Baubock “Citizenship in Cloud Cuckoo Land?” in R. Bauböck (ed) Debating Transformation 
of National Citizenship (Cham: Springer, 2018); Sanchez “A Citizenship Right to Stay?” note 3 above, pp. 390-391 
(on the need to recuperate the static dimension of Union citizenship). 
43 O’Brien, “Unity in Adversity” ” note 7 above, p.35. 
44 See O’Brien, “Unity in Adversity” note 7 above, p.243; Spaventa, “Earned Citizenship” note 39 above, p.215; N. 
Nic Shuibne, “Recasting EU Citizenship as Federal Citizenship: What are the Implications for the Citizen When the 
Polity Bargain is Privileged?” in D. Kochenov (ed.) EU Citizenship and Federalism, note 4 above, p.158. 
45 See in this sense Neuvonen, “EU Citizenship and its very Specific Essence” note 4 above, 1220 (“the question of 
what EU citizenship means in itself, without any reference to movement, is one of the most important facing EU 
citizenship”). 
46 O’Brien, “Unity in Adversity” ” note 7 above, p.243; Spaventa, “Earned Citizenship” note 39 above, p.215; Nic 
Shuibne, “Recasting EU Citizenship as Federal Citizenship” note 44 above, p.158. 
47 On Union citizenship as a fundamental status see e.g. Grzelczyk (C-184/99) EU:C:2001:458. 
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Home Member States and the Right to Free Movement 
 
A first vindication of the role of home Member States in the European regime of free movement comes 
from the foundational character, in this context, of the right to leave a Member State of origin. As the ECJ 
has remarked, ‘the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaties would be rendered meaningless if a 
State of origin could prohibit its own nationals from leaving without justification’.48 The 1960s directives 
laying down rules implementing free movement of workers already referred to the right to leave a 
Member State. 49 Article 4 of Directive 2004/38 (the Citizenship Directive) now provides for the right of 
all Union nationals who hold an identity card or passport to leave any Member State to travel to another 
one.50  
 
The legislative definition of the right to leave does not do justice, in any case, to the scope and range of 
obligations that the right to free movement calls for on the part of home Member States. The breadth and 
depth of these obligations have been partly clarified by the jurisprudence of the ECJ interpreting articles 
21 and 20 TFEU.  
 
Article 21 TFEU and the Obligation to Facilitate Movement 
  
The attention paid, in both legislation and case law, to the avoidance of restrictions to movement mirrors 
into a Member States’ obligation to facilitate the same.51 Home Member States bear a significant, if not 
the most important, part of this obligation. First of all, they must remove any direct impediment to the 
exercise of the right to free movement. Article 4 of the Citizenship Directive refers in this sense to exit 
visa and comparable formalities. Beyond refraining from introducing any of these, home Member States 
are responsible for guaranteeing the identity of their own nationals through identity cards and passports.52 
In response to a group of preliminary references submitted between 2007 and 2011 by Romanian and 
Bulgarian courts, and mostly relying on article 21 TFEU, the ECJ has further specified obligations 
pertaining to direct impediments.53 Home Member States cannot restrict their nationals’ travel through 
restraining orders or travel bans, unless these are based on the personal conduct of the relevant national 
and represent a proportionate measure in order to prevent a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat 
to a fundamental interest of society.54 For instance, restraint on travel due to an outstanding unsecured 
debt towards a private entity does not meet the test according to the court.55 
 
                                                 
48 Ministerul Administratiei si internelor – Directia Generala de Pasapoarte Bucuresti v Jipa (C-33/07) 
EU:C:2008:396; [2008] 3 C.M.L.R. 23, at [18]. 
49 Art.2 of Directive 64/240 on the abolition of restrictions on the movement and residence of Member State’s 
workers and their families within the Community [1964] OJ L981/64; art.2 of the Directive 68/360 on the abolition 
of restrictions on movement and residence within the Community for workers of Member States and their families 
[1968] OJ L257/13. 
50 Art.4 of Directive 2004/38. 
51 See e.g. Art. 4 of Directive 2004/38; Government of the French Community v Flemish Government (C-212/06) 
EU:C:2008:178; [2008] 2 C.M.L.R. 31. 
52 Art.4, paras 2 and 3 of Directive 2004/38. 
53 Cases Jipa (C-33/07) EU:C:2008:396; Byankov v Glaven sekretar na Ministerstvo na vetreshnite raboti (C-
249/11) EU:C:2012:608; [2013] 1 C.M.L.R. 15; Gaydarov v Director na Glavna direktsia “Ohranitelna politsia” 
pri Ministerstvo na vatreshnite raboti (C-430/10) EU:C:2011:749; Aladzhov v Zamestnik director na Stolichna 
direktsia na vatreshine raboti kam Ministerstvo na vatreshnite raboti (C-434/10) EU:C:2011:750. 
54 See Lazowski, “Darling You are Not Going Anywhere”, note 4 above, for comprehensive analysis. 
55 See Byankov (C-249/11) EU:C:2012:608. While in the case of travel bans justified by the relevant national’s prior 
expulsion from another Member State, prior conviction for a criminal offense in another Member State, or 
outstanding tax liability, the ultimate determination is left to the national court. See cases Jipa (C-33/07) 
EU:C:2008:396; Gaydarov (C-430/10) EU:C:2011:749; Aladzhov (C-434/10) EU:C:2011:750. 
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The obligation to avoid direct impediments on movement may seem obvious in the optic of fulfilling the 
right to leave which is essential to freedom of movement. A much subtler, but far reaching manifestation 
of the home Member States’ duty to facilitate free movement is in the obligation not to discourage its 
exercise through indirect restrictions. 
 
The rationale for sanctioning indirect restrictions of movement can be traced back to the early case law on 
social security in the context of free movement of workers. In the 1964 Unger ruling, concerning the 
community definition of worker for purposes of social security coordination, the court referred to the 
objective of establishing ‘as complete a freedom of movement for workers as possible’.56 Building on this 
objective, in the subsequent Nonnenmacher case, the court found that the provisions of the Treaties on 
coordination of social security had to be construed so as ‘to avoid placing migrant workers in an 
unfavourable legal position’.57 From rationale for the coordination of social security in these early cases, 
the goal of eliminating obstacles and restrictions soon became a fundamental pillar of the architecture of 
EU free movement as a whole.58 It was mentioned in the preamble to the first regulation on free 
movement of workers.59 And reiterated in the case law that came to target as infringements of the right to 
free movement “measures capable of hindering or rendering less attractive the exercise by Community 
nationals of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty”.60 The landmark 1995 Bosman ruling on 
free movement of workers clarified the terms of home Member States’ responsibilities in this sense. The 
court outlawed fees due between clubs in conjunction with the transfer of football players on the ground 
that ‘provisions which preclude or deter a national of a Member State from leaving the country of origin 
in order to exercise the right of freedom of movement constitute an obstacle to that freedom’.61 While the 
resulting obligation of home Member States not to deter movement was anchored in Bosman to the Treaty 
provisions on economic free movement, the court soon extended the same obligation to free movement of 
citizens. In D’Hoop, it found that  
 
“National legislation which places at a disadvantage certain of its nationals simply because they 
have exercised their freedom to move and to reside in another Member State would give rise to 
inequality of treatment, contrary to the principles which underpin the status of citizen of the 
Union, that is, the guarantee of the same treatment in law in the exercise of the citizen’s freedom 
to move.”62 
 
As a result, article 21 TFEU has become the umbrella for a wide range of home Member States’ 
obligations aimed at not discouraging citizens’ free movement.  
 
A first group of obligations in this sense pertains to the exportability of benefits from the Member State of 
origin to a host Member State. Exportability of benefits finds its source once again in the community 
regime on coordination of social security systems. 63 It is a key principle in the relevant regime, but the 
case law has brought it beyond the boundaries of social security. On the one hand, restriction of free 
                                                 
56 Unger v Bestuur der Bedrijfsvereniging voor Detailhandel en Ambachten (C-75/63) EU:C:1964:19; [1964] 
C.M.L.R. 319. 
57 Moebs v Bestuur der Sociale Verzkerings Bank (C-92/63) EU:C:1964:40; [1964] C.M.L.R. 338. 
58 In this sense see N. Nic Shuibne, “Reconnecting Free Movement of Workers and Equal Treatment in an Unequal 
Europe” (2018) 43 E.L. Rev. 477, 497-498. Also see R. Cornelissen, “50 Years of European Social Security 
Coordination” (2009) 11 European Journal of Social Security 16; Petroni v Office national des pensions pour 
travailleurs salariés (ONPTS) Bruxelles (C-64/75) EU:C:1975:129. 
59 Regulation 1612/68 on freedom of movement for workers within the Community [1968] OJ L257/2. 
60 Government of the French Community v Flemish Government (C-212/06) EU:C:2008:178 at [45]. 
61 Bosman (C-415/93) EU:C:1995:463. 
62 D'Hoop (C-224/98) at [34]-[35]; Pusa v Osuuspankkien Keskinainen Vakuutusyhtio (C-224/02) EU:C:2004:273; 
[2004] 2 C.M.L.R. 23 at [20]. 
63 Art. 7 of Regulation 883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems [2004] OJ L166/1. 
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movement reasoning has led the court to extend the rule of exportability to benefits that are treated as 
exceptions in the context of social security legislation.64 On the other hand, the same reasoning has 
grounded home Member States’ obligations to award to non-resident nationals a wide range of benefits 
beyond those falling within the scope of the social security regime. Relevant benefits include, for 
instance, war victim benefits and care and support allowances for disabled persons.65 The rationale being 
that loss of any such benefit would make the prospect of free movement less appealing, if not forbidding, 
for a citizen. In the relevant cases the court has recognized that national legislation can legitimately aim at 
establishing a genuine link between the recipient of a benefit and the awarding Member State. However it 
has repeatedly found that a requirement of physical presence is not justified in this respect and a genuine 
link can be established through other means.66 Reasoning along the same lines, the court has also 
grounded the obligation of home Member States to provide study finance to nationals who choose to 
attend a program of study in another Member State. As in the case law on other types of benefits, the 
court has consistently ruled that residence requirements for students to receive exportable study finance in 
a home Member State are disproportionate.67 
 
Not only can the loss of financial benefits deter movement. Administrative inconvenience can prompt the 
same effect. In this respect, the home Member States’ role as facilitators also encompasses the obligation 
to recognize names as spelled, and registered in the records of another Member State.68 Discrepancies 
between names recorded in passports issued by the Member State of nationality, and the name as used and 
recorded in routine transactions in a Member State of residence are indeed liable to cause 
misunderstandings and confusion. With a resulting undue burden on Union citizens who have exercised 
free movement.69  
 
Finally, the home Member States’ obligation to facilitate movement also embraces duties owed to family 
members of migrant citizens. The rationale for derivative rights for family members in the context of free 
movement has always been not discouraging the right to move of the sponsor migrant in the first place.70 
                                                 
64 For instance unemployment benefits; see e.g. De Cuyper v Office National de l’Emploi (C-406/04) 
EU:C:2006:491; [2006] 3 C.M.L.R. 44 (although ultimately the benefits were not found to be exportable here). Also 
see Y. Jorens, and F. van Overmeiren, “General Principles of Coordination in Regulation 883/2004” (2009) 11(2) 
European Journal of Social Security 1. 
65 For war victim benefits, Tas-Hagen v Raadskamer WUBO van de Pensioen- en Uitkeringsraad (C-192/05) 
EU:C:2006:676; [2007] 1 C.M.L.R. 23; Nerkowska v Zaklad Ubezpieczen Spolecznych Oddzial w Koszalinie (C-
499/06) EU:C:2008:300; [2008] 3 C.M.L.R. 8; for disability support Lucy Stewart v Secretary of State for Work and 
Pensions (C-503/09) EU:C:2011:500; [2012] 1 C.M.L.R. 13 and Proceedings brought by A (C-679/16) 
EU:C:2018:601. 
66 E.g. Proceedings brought by A (C-679/16) EU:C:2018:601, at [69]-[70]. 
67 See e.g. Martens v Minister van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschap (C-359/13) EU:C:2015:118; [2015] 3 
C.M.L.R 3, Morgan v Bezirksregierung Koln (C-11/06) EU:C:2007:626; [2009] 1 C.M.L.R 1; Thiele Meneses v 
Region Hannover (C-220/12) EU:C:2013:683.  
68 Grunkin v Grunkin Paul (C-353/06) EU:C:2008:559; [2009] 1 C.M.L.R 10; Proceedings brought by Freitag (C-
541/15) EU:C:2017:432; [2018] 1 C.M.L.R. 11. The obligation is borne primarily albeit not exclusively by home 
Member States. For a host State example, see Garcia Avello v Belgium (C-148/02) EU:C:2003:539; [2004] 1 
C.M.L.R. 1. In truth, the judicial assessment of relevant Member State obligations has been more cautious than in 
the benefits domain. In name cases, the Court has sought to balance the interest of citizens in unimpeded movement, 
with the interest of Member States in preserving their cultural and constitutional traditions as expressed in the rules 
surrounding the composition of names. See e.g. Sayn Wittgenstein v Landeshauptmann von Wien (C-208/09) 
EU:C:2010:806; [2011] 2 C.M.L.R. 28; Runevic-Vardyn v Vilniaus Miesto Savivaldybes Administracija (C-391/09) 
EU:C:2011:291; [2011] 3 C.M.L.R. 13; Bogendorff von Wolffersdorff v Standesamt der Stadt Karlsruhe (C-438/14) 
EU:C:2016:401; [2017] 1 C.M.L.R. 4. 
69 Grunkin Paul (C-353/06) EU:C:2008:559. 
70 Iida v Stadt Ulm (C-40/11) EU:C:2012:691; [2013] 1 C.M.L.R. 47, at [68]. 
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This justifies the right of family members to join the sponsor migrant in a host Member State.71 Beyond 
this, the restriction of free movement test has led to the recognition of the right of family members to 
follow the sponsor migrant when he or she returns to the home Member State: a Union citizen, if faced 
with the prospect of being unable to continue the family life that he may have built or consolidated in a 
host Member State upon return to the Member State of origin, would be deterred from moving.72 Hence 
the home Member States’ obligation to admit to residence, upon their nationals’ return, their family 
members, whether Union citizens or third country nationals. Relevant family members include according 
to a lengthening line of cases, spouses, whether hetero- or same sex, and unregistered partners.73  
 
Facilitating free movement through removing obstacles to its exercise is certainly not an exclusive 
prerogative of home Member States. Host Member States have wide ranging obligations in this sense, that 
in most cases track the categories distinguished above. The judicial trend however has been towards a 
lightening of the burden that host Member States, as opposed to home ones, bear in this respect. This is 
particularly evident in the case law on social benefits and on student finance. With regard to social 
benefits, as examined in the previous part, the court, after an initial rights-protective phase, has 
increasingly made room for host Member States’ financial concerns. It has not been nearly as amenable to 
the interests of home Member States in corresponding cases on exportability of benefits.74 As to student 
finance, the court has accepted the legislative solution that the award of relevant finance on the part of a 
host Member State be subject to a five year prior residence requirement.75 In the case of awards on the 
part of home Member States the court has instead held all manners of prior residence requirements to 
constitute disproportionate restrictions of free movement: even a prior residence requirement of three 
years, or of three years within the previous six, unduly deters movement.76 Technically, the diverging 
trend depends on the court’s different use of the Treaty provisions on citizenship respectively in host 
Member State and home Member State cases.  In host Member State cases the court tends to no longer 
resort to Treaty provisions, remaining within the boundaries of the rules of secondary legislation.77 The 
Citizenship Directive has become, in other words, a barrier to a more protective reading of Treaty 
provisions on citizenship.78 In home Member State cases instead the court has kept carving out of article 
21 TFEU always new obligations, filling gaps where needed through the application by analogy of 
protective provisions of the Citizenship Directive.79  
 
                                                 
71 Art.7(1)(d) of Directive 2004/38. 
72 Iida (C-40/11) EU:C:2012:691 at [70]; O&B v Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel (C-456/12) 
EU:C:2014:135; [2014] 3 C.M.L.R. 17 
73 O&B (C-456/12) EU:C:2014:135; Coman v Inspectoratul General pentru Imigrari and Ministerul Afacerilor 
Interne C-673/16 EU:C:2018:385; Secretary of State for Home Department v Banger (C-89/17) EU:C:2018:570; 
[2019] 1 C.M.L.R. 6. One limit is that the entry of the third country national family member must be a natural 
consequence of the Union citizen’s return to the home Member State – See Altiner and Ravn v Udlændingestyrelsen 
(C-230/17) EU:C:2018:497. 
74 For a recent take, see Proceedings brought by A (C-679/16) EU:C:2018:601. 
75 Förster (C-158/07) EU:C:2008:630. Art. 24 of Directive 2004/38 on the right of citizens of the Union and their 
family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States [2004] OJ L158/77. 
76 Prinz and Seeberger v Region Hannover (C-523/11) EU:C:2013:524; [2014] 1 C.M.L.R. 16; Martens (C-359/13) 
EU:C:2015:118. 
77 See Dano (C-333/13) EU:C:2014:2358; Alimanovic (C-67/14) EU:C:2015:597; García-Nieto (C-299/14) 
EU:C:2016:114. 
78 See Spaventa, “Citizenship: Reallocating Responsibilities to the Member State of Origin” note 19 above; 
Spaventa, “What is Left of Union Citizenship?” note 11 above. But see, Biffi v Deutscher Leichtathletikverband e.V. 
(C-22/18) EU:C:2019:497.  
79 See e.g. O&B (C-456/12) EU:C:2014:135.  
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According to some comments this trend represents the turn to a “cosmetic” version of supranational 
citizenship.80 From a different angle, it points to the often disregarded role of home Member States in the 
organization of the EU regime of free movement. A role that not only finds expression in the obligation to 
facilitate movement, but also takes shape through the further duty to provide a range of guarantees in 
conjunction with its exercise.  
 
Article 21 TFEU and the Obligation to Act as Guarantors 
 
As a result of the obligations that the court has carved out of article 21 TFEU, home Member States stand 
as silent guarantors in the context of free movement. Towards host Member States, they act as guarantors 
in respect to the conduct of their migrant citizens and its consequences; and towards their migrant citizens 
they act as guarantors for the protection of their rights.  
 
The case law on Union citizens’ protection from expulsion illustrates the former side of this duty of home 
Member States as guarantors. Union citizens are subject to expulsion from a host Member State when 
they represent a threat to public security, public policy or public health.
81 Expulsion requires however that 
the Union citizen pose a ‘present and sufficiently serious threat to one of the fundamental interests of 
society’, and requires the expelling Member State to weigh the decision against factors pertaining, among 
others, to the family situation and to the social and cultural integration of the relevant citizen.82 Relevant 
factors gain increasing weight with length of residence in a host Member State. After five years of 
residence, an expulsion decision can only be made for serious reasons of public security. After ten years, 
it has to be for imperative reasons.83 Nonetheless, in the cases that meet these thresholds, it falls to home 
Member States to take back their threatening nationals. Similar to the judicial trend in the context of 
movement facilitation duties, the home Member State’s responsibility in this sense has found 
reinforcement in recent case law. The court has interpreted the notion of public security to include 
criminal offences that for their seriousness may threaten ‘the calm and physical security of the 
population’.84 In bringing this way the notion of public security closer to that of public policy, it has 
watered down the exacting heightened threshold of ‘imperative reasons of public security’ for the 
expulsion of long term resident Union citizens.85 It has also ruled that a citizen’s periods of imprisonment 
in the host Member State interrupt the period of residence for purposes of heightened protection and may 
affect the grant of heightened protection even to a person that had resided ten years in the host Member 
State prior to imprisonment.86 In all the relevant cases, the offense brought to the values of the host 
Member State on the part of the acting Union citizen marks his lack of integration.87 Such lack of 
integration brings back responsibility for his conduct to the home Member State.   
 
                                                 
80 Spaventa, “What is Left of Union Citizenship” note 11 above. This goes together with a tendency to no longer 
read the Citizenship Directive in a way favorable to citizens. See L. Azoulai and S. Coutts “Restricting Union 
Citizens’ Residence Rights on Grounds of Public Security. Where Union Citizenship and the AFSJ Meet: P.I. Case 
C-348/09 P.I. v Oberbürgermeisterin der Stadt Remscheid, Judgment of the Court of Justice, Grand Chamber, of 22 
May 2012, nyr” (2013) 50 C.M.L.R. 553, 568. 
81 Art.27 of Directive 2004/38. 
82 Art.27 par.2, art.28 par.1 of Directive 2004/38. Also see Regina v Pierre Buchereau (30/77) EU:C:1977:172; 
[1977] 2 C.M.L.R. 800; Land Baden-Württemberg v Panagiotis Tsakouridis (C-145/09) EU:C:2010:708; [2011] 2 
C.M.L.R. 11, par.48; P.I. v Oberbürgermeisterin der Stadt Remscheid (C-348/09) EU:C:2012:300, at [30].   
83 Art.28 of Directive 2004/38. 
84 Tsakouridis (C-145/09) EU:C:2010:708 at [44-47]; P.I. (C-348/09) EU:C:2012:300 at [28]. 
85 In this sense, see Azoulai and Coutts “Restricting Union Citizens’ Residence Rights” note 80 above, 559-561. 
86 Secretary of State for the Home Department v M.G. (C-400/12) EU:C:2014:9; [2014] 2 C.M.L.R. 40. 
87 M.G. (C-400/12) EU:C:2014:9 at [30]-[32]; also see S. Coutts, “The Absence of Integration and the 
Responsabilisation of Union Citizenship” (2018) 3 European Papers 761, 776.  
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This outcome may seem obvious. As a matter of international law, only nationals of a state have an 
absolute right of stay.88 Non-nationals can always become subject to expulsion.89 But while in the broader 
international context the obligation of states of nationality to take back their nationals is a result of 
nationality working as a ‘filing system’,90 in the European Union that obligation depends on the central 
role of home Member States in the system of free movement. Home Member States confer through their 
nationality the very passport for free movement, supranational citizenship.91 Through that conferral they 
accept the rules of free movement, and they impliedly warrant that their citizens will play by these rules. 
One effect of this implied warranty is that they undertake to take their citizens back should their 
integration process in a host Member State fail, as signalled by their engagement in crime. That silent 
guarantee blows force into the system of free movement. Like most freedoms, free movement is not free. 
It has its price – availability to integrate into a host Member State and embrace its values and rules; it has 
bearers of that price – the migrant citizens -; and it has guarantors for its payment –home Member States 
whose doors must remain wide open for returning citizens-.  
 
In the case law on extradition, the duty of home Member States to act as guarantors stretches in a further 
direction. In Petruhhin and Pisciotti, the court derived from article 21 TFEU a home Member State’s right 
to be consulted before a host Member State honoured a request for the extradition of one of the former 
Member State’s nationals to a third country. 92 In both cases, the addressees of the relevant extradition 
request were Union citizens and non-nationals of the requested Member State.93  Hence national rules 
protecting citizens from extradition did not apply to them. The ECJ found the resulting difference in 
treatment with nationals to represent a restriction of free movement.94 The restriction was justified, 
among others, by the legitimate purpose of preventing impunity: while a State of nationality can prosecute 
its own nationals in alternative to extraditing them, a State of residence would have difficulties in 
establishing jurisdiction.95 In both cases, the court then turned to home Member States. It found that it 
was the responsibility of home Member States, rather than of host ones, to restore equal treatment for 
their citizens. To this end the host Member State had to consult the home one in order to give it a chance 
to issue a European arrest warrant and prosecute the relevant citizen in its territory.96 This solution brings 
back the responsibility for the protection of Union citizens’ rights in the context of criminal prosecution to 
their home Member States.97 Home Member States act in this sense as ultimate guarantors towards their 
citizens for their right to equal treatment in the context of free movement, and for the rights in whose 
respect they are entitled to equal treatment.   
 
                                                 
88 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art.12(4); European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Protocol 4, art.3. 
89 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art.13. 
90 See R. Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1992), pp.67-72. 
91 Art. 20 TFEU. 
92 Criminal Proceedings against Petruhhin (C-182/15) EU:C:2016:630; [2017] 1 C.M.L.R. 28; Pisciotti v Germany 
(C-191/16) EU:C:2018:222; [2018] 3 C.M.L.R. 19. 
93 Petruhhin (C-182/15) EU:C:2016:630; Pisciotti (C-191/16) EU:C:2018:222. The difference between the two 
cases is in that in Petruhhin the relevant Union citizen was resident in the host Member State and there was no 
extradition agreement between the host Member State and the third country requesting extradition. In Pisciotti the 
relevant Union citizen was just in transit in the host Member State (on a stop over in Germany during a flight back 
from Nigeria) and there was an extradition agreement between Germany and the US. 
94 Petruhhin (C-182/15) EU:C:2016:630 at [32]-[33]; Pisciotti (C-191/16) EU:C:2018:222 at [45]. 
95 Petruhhin (C-182/15) EU:C:2016:630 at [37]-[40]; Pisciotti (C-191/16) EU:C:2018:222 at [47].  
96 Petruhhin (C-182/15), EU:C:2016:630 at [50]; Pisciotti (C-191/16) EU:C:2018:222 at [56]. 
97 A different solution was recently adopted in Raugevicius, case in which the addressee of the extradition request 
was a permanent resident of the host Member State. In this case the host Member State had to take responsibility. 
Proceedings Relating to Raugevicius (C-247/17) EU:C:2018:898; [2019] 2 C.M.L.R. 3. 
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This duty of guarantee concurs with the duty of facilitation in illustrating how, contrary to what is often 
perceived, home Member States are key players in the EU regime of free movement. Through removing 
restrictions and acting as guarantors in different directions, they make free movement factually possible 
for their citizens, and acceptable for receiving Member States. This role of theirs in the context of article 
21 TFEU ultimately adds up to and clarifies a broader duty they bear, under article 20 TFEU, in respect 
not just to free movement, but to supranational citizenship as a whole. 
 
Article 20 TFEU and the Duty of Non-Deprivation 
 
Article 20 TFEU requires home Member States not to unduly deprive their nationals of their Union 
citizenship and of the rights that come with it.
98 As free movement is the most prominent among the latter 
rights, obligations arising in this sense out of article 20 TFEU stand in continuity with those emerging 
from article 21 TFEU. 
 
The article 20 duty of non-deprivation has been spelled out first in cases on nationality. It is a long 
standing EU law rule that the power to decide on matters of nationality, albeit resting with the Member 
States, must be exercised ‘with due regard to EU law’.99 In Rottmann, the ECJ clarified that situations 
involving withdrawal of the nationality of a Member State with a resulting loss of Union citizenship fall 
‘by reason of their nature and consequences’ within the scope of EU law.100 Article 20 TFEU requires that 
decisions concerning relevant situations respect the principle of proportionality. In particular, in taking 
relevant decisions the Member States must take into account the rights and interests attaching to Union 
citizenship, through a review of the involved individual circumstances.101 In Rottmann this duty of 
individualized assessment was linked to the deprivation of citizenship status and of the rights attached to 
it.102 In Tjebbes, the court clarified that national authorities had to consider, as part of their assessment of 
individual circumstances, limitations to the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States resulting of the deprivation of Union citizenship status.103 
 
Case law in the Ruiz Zambrano line corroborates the duty of non-deprivation delineated in the context of 
nationality.104 The ruling in Ruiz Zambrano openly departed from the rule that EU citizenship is only 
engaged in situations involving a cross-border link for as feeble as this can be. The facts of the case 
revolved around the minor child of a Colombian national. The child had been born a Belgian national and 
thus Union citizen. However absent a residence and work permit for his father in Belgium, he would have 
been de facto forced to leave the territory of the EU.105 While the child had never moved within the EU 
and the orthodox rules on Union citizenship would not apply to his case, the court found that denying his 
father’s claim for a residence and work permit would have amounted to an interference with the “genuine 
substance” of the child’s Union citizenship, in breach of article 20 TFEU.106 The potential scope of the 
                                                 
98 Rottmann v Freistaat Bayern (C-135/08) EU:C:2010:104; [2010] 3 C.M.L.R. 2. 
99 Micheletti v Delegacion del Gobierno en Cantabria (C-369/90) EU:C:1992:295. 
100 Rottmann (C-135/08) EU:C:2010:104 at [42]; also see Tjebbes v Minister can Buitenlandse Zaken (C-221/17) 
EU:C:2019:189; [2019] 2 C.M.L.R. 35 at [32]. 
101 Rottmann (C-135/08) EU:C:2010:104 at [55]-[56]; Tjebbes (C-221/17) EU:C:2019:189 at [30]-[32] and [40]-
[42]. 
102 Rottmann (C-135/08) EU:C:2010:104 at [46]. 
103 Tjebbes (C-221/17) EU:C:2019:189 at [46]. For a critical view, see D. Kochenov, “The Tjebbes Fail” (2019) 4 
European Papers 319; M. van den Brink, “Bold but Without Justification? Tjebbes” (2019) 4 European Papers 409. 
104 Ruiz Zambrano v Office National de l’Emploi (ONEm) (C-34/09) EU:C:2011:124; [2011] 2 C.M.L.R. 46. 
105 For an analysis, see F. Strumia “Ruiz Zambrano's Quiet Revolution:  Four Hundred and Sixty-Eight Days that 
Made the Immigration Case of One Deprived Worker into the Constitutional Case of Two Precarious Citizens” in B. 
Davies and F. Nicola (Eds.), EU Law Stories: Contextual and Critical Histories of European Jurisprudence 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2017). 
106 Zambrano (C-34/09) EU:C:2011:124 at [44]. 
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Ruiz Zambrano case was contained in an immediately following string of rulings, in which the court 
relied on debatable distinctions on the facts.107 Revived in a novel line of cases beginning in 2016,108 the 
Zambrano doctrine has nonetheless remained confined to a narrow set of ‘very specific situations’:109 as 
things stand, an offence to the genuine substance of Union citizenship requires that denial of residence to 
a third country national carer threaten a minor Union citizen child with being forced out of the territory of 
the European Union. 
 
Failing a convincing determination on the part of the ECJ, a rich vein of commentary has endeavoured to 
clarify what the genuine substance of Union citizenship amounts to.110  In particular, a recurring concern 
has been whether the genuine substance test departs from the traditional rule of engagement of Union 
citizenship based on movement, or whether it represents just a new prong of the same rule.111 Partial 
clarification in this sense has come with the rulings in Iida and Ymeraga. Here, the court has described the 
situations in which the genuine substance of citizenship is at stake as situations that have an “intrinsic 
connection to free movement”.112 Such definition has dispelled the smoke that surrounds the genuine 
substance doctrine only in part. For instance, in explicitly excluding from the scope of the doctrine 
situations in which the harm to free movement is merely hypothetical, the court has raised the doubt as to 
where the line falls between potential movement, which is protected, and hypothetical movement, which 
is not.113 Through reinstating a connection, albeit a hazy one, to free movement, the court has in any case 
brought back the novel doctrine towards the old tracks along which Union citizenship has always run.114 
In keeping a fil rouge with Rottmann and the case law on nationality, it has however moulded the 
traditional movement-linked rule of engagement into a test of non-deprivation of Union citizenship and its 
effect util.115 
 
This duty of non-deprivation, whether of the status of Union citizenship as in Rottmann, or of the bundle 
of rights that attaches to it as in Zambrano mirrors into a further positive role of home Member States. 
Home Member States are the very enablers of supranational citizenship. It is to this overarching role that 
the ensemble of home Member States’ obligations devised under both articles 20 and 21 TFEU ultimately 
gives sharper relief. 
 
Home Member States and Supranational Citizenship 
 
                                                 
107 See e.g. Dereci v Bundesministerium fur Inneres (C-256/11) EU:C:2011:734; [2012] 1 C.M.L.R. 45; McCarthy v 
Secretary of State for Home Department (C-434/09) EU:C:2011:277; [2011] 3 C.M.L.R. 10. In one of the cases 
rejection of the claim was linked precisely to its being addressed at a host rather than home Member State. The court 
found that the claimant Union citizen should have sought protection in the Member State of nationality where one of 
his parents lived. Alokpa v Ministre du Travail, de l’Emploi et de l’Immigration (C-86/12) EU:C:2013:645; [2017] 1 
C.M.L.R. 40. Also see Spaventa, “Earned Citizenship” note 39 above; also see Nic Shuibne, “(Some of) the Kids” 
note 5 above. 
108 Rendon Marin v Administracion del Estado (C-165/14) EU:C:2016:675; [2017] 1 C.M.L.R. 29; Secretary of 
State for the Home Department v CS (C-304/14) EU:C:2016:674; [2017] 1 C.M.L.R. 31. Chavez-Vilchez v Raad van 
Bestuur van de Sociale Verzekeringsbank (C-133/15) EU:C:2017:354; [2017] 3 C.M.L.R. 35.   
109 See Neuvonen, “EU Citizenship and its Very Specific Essence” note 4 above, 1212. 
110 Note 4 above. 
111 See e.g. Nic Shuibne “Some of the Kids”, note 4 above, 366-67; Neuvonen, “EU Citizenship and its very Specific 
Essence”, note 4 above, 1210. 
112 Kreshnik Ymeraga and Others v Ministre du Travail, de l’Emploi et de l’Immigration (C-87/12) EU:C:2013:291, 
[2013] 3 C.M.L.R. 33 at [37]; Iida (C-40/11) EU:C:2012:691, at [72]. Also see Reynolds, “Exploring the ‘Intrinsic 
Connection’”, note 4 above. 
113 See Tryfonidou “(Further) Signs of a Turn” note 4 above, 307-308. 
114 See Hoogenboom, “In search of a rationale”, note 4 above, 314-317. 
115 See Ymeraga (C-87/12) EU:C:2013:291 at [36]; Iida (C-40/11) EU:C:2012:691, at [71]. Also see Neuvonen, 
“EU Citizenship and its Very Specific Essence” note 4 above, 1213-14 and 1219. 
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Home Member States as Enablers of Supranational Citizenship 
 
At a formal level, it is the rule of derivation written in article 20 TFEU that crowns home Member States 
as enablers of supranational citizenship: “every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be 
a citizen of the Union”.116 Supranational citizenship derives from national one. Through managing the 
latter, home Member States enable the former. 
 
However the various obligations that the court has carved out of both articles 20 and 21 TFEU give 
substance to the role that the Treaties define only formally. At the same time those roles find a 
justification and a rationale in the home Member States’ role of enablers. As enablers of supranational 
citizenship, it falls to home Member States to facilitate the exercise of the main right that citizenship 
entails, movement; it falls to them to retain responsibility for their nationals that actively exercise 
supranational citizenship, guarding their fundamental rights and responding for their criminal conduct; 
and it falls to them not to unduly disable the supranational citizenship that they have enabled in the first 
place, whether through removing the underlying nationality, or through making it legally or practically 
impossible for the holder to remain within the European Union.  
 
The home Member States’ responsibility for enabling supranational citizenship places the duties of host 
Member States in the realm of free movement in perspective. The relevant responsibility overrides even 
the logic of integration that, as the court has repeatedly held, underpins the rights of Union citizens in a 
host Member State under article 21 TFEU and under the Citizenship Directive.
117 Home Member States 
can always switch off supranational citizenship and silence the rights accrued in its penumbra. They 
preside to the relation between national and supranational citizenship and they hold the ropes of the rights 
that the latter adds to the former.   
 
The enabling power that the management of that relation leaves to home Member States provides a 
possible reading key for the decision of the court in Lounes. 118 Here, the ECJ was faced with the question 
of whether a Spanish national residing in the UK and naturalized as a British national could claim family 
reunification with a third country national spouse under EU law. The court upheld her claim on the basis 
of article 21 TFEU. According to the court, denying the claimant’s EU law right to family reunification 
on the ground that she had naturalized would amount to denying her experience of free movement. It 
would place her in the same situation as a citizen of the host Member State who had never moved, and in 
a less favourable situation than a migrant citizen who had not naturalized.119 It would thus be contrary to 
the logic of gradual integration underpinning article 21 TFEU.120 While the court did not go there, one 
could also flip the perspective, and focus on the Member States’ obligation perspective, rather than on the 
citizens’ rights one. From this second perspective, the claimant’s host Member State had become, through 
her naturalization, also her home Member State. The UK co-held with Spain at this point the 
responsibility to enable the claimant’s supranational citizenship. With that role went the role to facilitate 
the claimant’s exercise of her rights as a Union citizen, including family reunification rights in the context 
of free movement.  
 
The complexity that the home Member States’ role of enablers takes on when filled with content through 
the obligations arising of articles 20 and 21 TFEU ultimately gives to that role a normative spin. Home 
Member States emerge as the ‘masters’ of supranational citizenship: they bear responsibility for 
                                                 
116 Art. 20 TFEU. 
117 See e.g. Lounes v Secretary of State for the Home Department (C-165/16) EU:C:2017:862; [2018] 2 C.M.L.R. 9; 
also see M.G. (C-400/12) EU:C:2014:9, at [30].   
118 Lounes (C-165/16) EU:C:2017:862. 
119 Lounes (C-165/16) EU:C:2017:862 at [54] and at [59]. 
120 Lounes (C-165/16) EU:C:2017:862 at [58]. 
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supranational citizenship’s removal, its activation, and its side effects. With this normative take, their role 
of enablers gains in turn potential analytical significance. It is precisely keeping this broader 
responsibility of home Member States in purview that could guide the hands of the court through the 
several black holes that constellate citizenship doctrine at present: where does the substance of Union 
citizenship lie; what constitutes an intrinsic connection to free movement; and where does the watershed 
between home and host Member State responsibility for migrant citizens fall in a range of grey areas such 
as criminal liability and family reunification in split family contexts.121 
 
Beyond the practical answers that it may yield in these cases, highlighting the multifaceted role of home 
Member States in the context of supranational citizenship contributes to rebut the presumption that every 
time the protection of citizenship rights “falls back on the national” this is because of the shortfalls of 
supranational citizenship. Supranational citizenship, as the home Member States’ role of enablers 
reminds, has its breeding ground in the national domain.  It derives from national citizenship and tracks it 
like a shadow. But it also acts on it and alters the way in which citizens benefit from their status of 
nationality.122 It adds to national citizenship a right to cross-borders, physically or virtually.123 This right 
raises the voice of national citizens beyond national borders, it brings their economic and social claims to 
the borders of other Member States, it projects their interests into the territorial space of other nations, and 
it blends the values on which national citizenship rests with those of other national citizenships. In this 
sense supranational citizenship upgrades national citizenship and alters its prospects. 124  
 
It is this empowerment of national citizenship, rather than the disempowerment of supranational one, that 
attracts back towards the national domain, and within the sphere of competence of home Member States, 
a number of responsibilities. These include responsibilities in relation to solidarity obligations and to the 
non-mobile. While relevant responsibilities are often considered as a site of absence of supranational 
citizenship, they rather signal the subtle way in which supranational citizenship changes the 
responsibilities of Member States towards their own citizens. 
 
Transnational Solidarity Out of Self-Interest 
 
The problem of sourcing transnational solidarity has long tormented the literature on supranational 
citizenship. It has inspired a varied range of scholarly perspectives.125 But the question ‘whence 
transnational solidarity?’ has never been conclusively answered. The home Member States’ role as 
enablers of supranational citizenship yields a peculiar argument on solidarity. It suggests a reciprocity 
                                                 
121 On the relevance of split family situations for EU law see Tryfonidou “(Further) Signs of a Turn”, note 4 above. 
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(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); A. Sangiovanni, “Solidarity in the European Union” (2013) 33 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 213; M. Ferrera, The Boundaries of Welfare: European Integration and New Spatial 
Politics of Social Protection (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); P. Neuvonen, Equal Citizenship and its 
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argument based on self-interest: Member States owe financial solidarity to citizens of other Member 
States in order to reciprocate the recognition of solidarity, on the part of those other Member States, to 
their own citizens. Their duty derives from their self-interest in protecting the transnational rights of their 
own citizens. 
 
The possible role of reciprocity in the context of transnational solidarity has been considered before. 
Sangiovanni has magistrally argued that EU integration should be intended as a project enhancing the 
Member States’ growth and internal problem solving capacity.126 In the context of this project, he has 
advanced an idea of inter-state solidarity inspired by reciprocity-based internationalism and grounded in 
an insurance model. In his words, “Member States owe one another at the level at which each State would 
have insured against the potential losses that integration may cause, had they not known their place in the 
system”.127 Transnational solidarity, that is, solidarity among the citizens rather than the States, comes in 
his proposed model as a ripple effect of interstate solidarity. In an organization such as the EU whose 
subjects are both States and citizens, what Member States owe to other Member States they owe also to 
those States’ citizens.128 In a similar direction, Eleftheriadis has described transnational solidarity as “an 
obligation of fairness between Member States that are engaged in a cooperative activity”. In his view, 
fairness between states requires a “safety net” for the individuals who are citizens of those states.129 
 
The argument presented here is a specification of the above arguments. The Member States reciprocally 
owe one another at the level necessary for each of them to protect the cross-border rights of their own 
citizens and fully discharge their enabling role from a welfare protection perspective. In other words, they 
owe to other Member States, and to their citizens, what they would expect their citizens to receive in other 
Member States in order to be fully enabled to exercise their rights to move and reside throughout the 
European Union.  
 
This argument suggests that in the context of the EU system of free movement transnational solidarity is 
more likely to arise from the reciprocal recognition of freedom rather than from the sense of a shared 
identity. It is the individual freedom to move across borders, and leave any Member State to resettle in 
another one, that requires a measure of transnational solidarity. And it is protection of this individual 
freedom that grounds the Member States’ obligation of mutual responsibility for the welfare of one 
another’s nationals.
 130   
 
The Non-Mobile as Transnational Stakeholders 
 
The above presented perspective on transnational solidarity focuses on the Union citizens’ freedom to 
physically leave the territory of a home Member State to resettle in another one. While the physical aspect 
of that freedom has attracted the most attention in legislation, case law and literature,131 there is also a 
virtual aspect to it, and to the corresponding obligation of home Member States to protect such freedom.  
 
Through enabling their supranational citizenship, home Member States allow their citizens to reach 
beyond national boundaries and articulate their interests within different collective spheres organized at 
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national level in other Member States.132 While the European Union is not a community of life and 
destiny comparable to the national community, the coming into contact through supranational citizenship 
of those nationally organized collective spheres yields a community of values and a wider shared context 
of operation for the Member States and their citizens.  This wider context substantiates a common 
physical and conceptual territory of the Union that has been given legal relevance for the first time 
through the doctrine descending from Ruiz Zambrano: the genuine substance of Union citizenship lies in 
the right of Member States’ nationals to articulate their life within that conceptual territory.133  
 
Different voices have remarked how this right makes Union citizens into transnational, or trans-
institutional, individuals.134 What has however passed under the radar is the relevance of that very right 
for static citizens. Supranational citizenship gives to Member States’ nationals a stake in those other 
national collective spaces and in the Union wide community of values that joins them together.   
 
That stake has virtual, potential and metaphorical expressions. It may find virtual expression, for instance, 
in the establishment and remote management of a company in another Member State or in civic 
entrepreneurship. It is potential when it represents a side effect of the physical movement of other EU 
citizens. An otherwise sedentary Italian citizen who may one day retire to Germany to be close to a 
migrant worker son has a potential stake in the German healthcare and old age provision system. It is 
metaphorical as a result of participation in a project pursuing shared political purposes. Each Union 
citizen has a metaphorical stake, for instance, in the way the different Member States implement the 
common immigration policy and contribute to the management of common external borders. Whatever 
passes through these borders or is pushed back behind them will respectively reach, or be banned from, 
that citizen’s polity.  
 
Virtual, potential, and metaphorical stakes belong to static as well as to mobile citizens. They turn both 
classes into transnational stakeholders. If the transnational stakes of mobile citizens call for protection on 
the part of both host and home Member States, those of static citizens are entrusted to home Member 
States only. Protection of those stakes passes in part through the non-disabling obligation of home 
Member States. In part, it passes through the positive duty to make available to static citizens the 
machinery of the State to exercise their transnational stakes. This includes, for instance, having national 
courts hear the citizens’ claims under EU law and send preliminary references to the ECJ;
135 having 
national Parliaments represent the citizens’ interests in the Union legislative process;136 and having the 
national bureaucracy administer and assign EU funds to different national projects including civil society 
initiatives.137  In catering this way to their static citizens’ transnational stakes, home Member States 
protect their supranational citizenship, and fully discharge their role of enablers. In the words of Loic 
Azoulai, they enable the “transnational sovereignty of European individuals”.138  
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The analysis in this article has brought the perspective of home Member States to bear on the assessment 
of Union citizenship in its relation to free movement. Looking at that relation through the home Member 
States’ lens ultimately yields alternative viewpoints in two important respects.  
 
The first of these is the widespread tendency to associate a “return to the national” when it comes to 
citizenship and free movement with an idea of supranational citizenship’s weakness and 
disempowerment.139 That idea disregards in part the reciprocal nature of the relation between national and 
supranational citizenship. The latter derives from the former. However, through adding novel 
responsibilities for home Member States in respect to national citizenship, it also stretches and 
strengthens the latter. From this perspective, the entrustment of responsibility for the status and rights 
attaching to Union citizenship to home Member States does not make Union citizenship less 
“supranational”. It rather contributes to upgrading the relationship between Member States and their 
nationals to the supranational sphere. 
 
The second respect in which the home Member States’ perspective offers a novel viewpoint has to do 
with the disenchantment that grips recent scholarship on citizenship and the right to free movement. Such 
disenchantment has prompted attempts to redirect intellectual discussions away from either side of the 
citizenship-free movement relation. Relevant attempts have found expression for instance in arguments to 
rescale the focus on rights in the study of supranational citizenship.140 As well as in arguments aimed at 
resisting, managing or repackaging rights to free movement.141 In respect of both arguments the home 
Member States’ perspective prompts further reflection. 
 
With regard to the rights’ perspective, the article findings point to a particular entitlement that Union 
citizenship embodies and that has remained partly disguised in the penumbra of the movement, 
fundamental, and social rights attaching to it from time to time. This is an entitlement to cross borders 
that has a material and a virtual side. It finds only partial manifestation in the right to free movement and 
it embraces static Union citizens through turning them into transnational stakeholders. Turning the 
attention to this right to cross borders does not diminish the importance of passing supranational 
citizenship through a prism other than the legal, rights-based one. But it exhorts to combine that effort 
with a further reflection on the span and frontiers of supranational citizenship intended as a bundle of 
rights.  
 
With regard to free movement, what emerges in the article is that the right to free movement of citizens is 
a source of power and influence for their Member State of nationality. Narratives hostage to nationalism 
and populism have spread the sense that free movement weakens the Member States and their capacity for 
action through emptying the coffers of national welfare systems and through exposing national labour 
markets to undue competition. However from a different angle, the citizens’ right to free movement also 
bestows on Member States novel extraterritorial responsibilities, expanding in turn their spheres of 
influence. This empowering aspect of free movement cannot be disregarded and should become more 
central to any argument addressing resistance to open borders and cross-border movement. 
 
None of the arguments that the home Member States’ perspective highlights ultimately enshrines a 
panacea to solve all the ills of an ambitious but perhaps under-delivering notion such as that of 
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supranational citizenship. No such claim is made in the article. The renewal of supranational citizenship, 
and of its relation with the right to free movement, requires profound vision, pondered collective 
reflection and careful institutional design. The more modest contribution of the investigation carried out 
in these pages is to clarify the legacy of a momentous but troubled marriage, such as the one between 
Union citizenship and free movement. Host Member States’ duties play a prominent role in judicial and 
scholarly narratives on that union. But its offspring rights are entrusted in important part to the 
guardianship of home Member States.  
